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Sovereignty for Sale? Coping with 
Marginality in the South Pacific –  
the Example of Niue
John Overton, Warwick E. Murray
This paper examines the case of Niue, a small raised atoll with a population of under 
1500 that is self-governing in free association with New Zealand. Its marginality in terms 
of physical and economic isolation, small size and harsh environment is pronounced.  
However, it has survived with relatively high living standards and a range of livelihood 
options for its population. The paper assesses Niue’s marginality and analyses its strategies 
for survival and development, focusing on the manner in which it has negotiated sovereignty.
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Suverenitet na prodaju? Hvatanje u koštac s marginalnošću u 
Južnom Pacifiku – primjer otoka Niuea
Rad se bavi primjerom otoka Niuea, malenoga izdignutog atola s manje od 1500 sta-
novnika, koji ima status samouprave u slobodnom savezu s Novim Zelandom. Marginalnost 
otoka Niuea u obliku fizičke i ekonomske izolacije te veličine i negostoljubivog okoliša 
vrlo je naglašena. No otok uspijeva održati relativno visok životni standard te ponuditi 
svom stanovništvu niz raznolikih opcija privređivanja. U radu se analizira marginalnost 
Niuea te njegova strategija preživljavanja i razvoja, s naglaskom na način na koji je otok 
dogovorio svoju neovisnost. 
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INtroductIoN: tHe coNdItIoN aNd ProceSSeS of MargINalIty
The concept of marginality has been discussed by social scientists for many years 
(Dickie-Clark, 1966; Germani 1980, Leimgruber 2004) but it is only recently that studies 
have pointed to some of the complexities and contradictory processes underlying the ways 
that the geographies of marginal places are shaped. It has become clear that marginality 
is multi-dimensional and dynamic, being comprised, for example, of environmental (re-
stricted resources and natural hazards), economic (remoteness, high transport costs) or 
demographic processes (falling populations and emigration). In attempting to understand 
geographies of marginalization, we need to distinguish between the condition of margina-
lity and the processes which lead to marginality. For the former, we need to acknowledge 
that marginality is conditional and relative (so that what might be marginal in a negative 
sense from one perspective may be seen more favourably by another). Marginality is, by 
definition, assessed in terms of comparison to that which is not marginal and such posi-
tionings will be culturally, economically and politically specific. Indeed, in some cases 
marginality itself may be considered an asset. In terms of the dynamism of marginality 
we should see constituent processes as potentially negative or positive, not fixed in time 
or space and differentiating with respect to outcomes among different groups and locales. 
Two particular dimensions of marginality are worthy of further scrutiny. These are 
the issues of scale and location. Scale is a determinant of marginality when smallness (of 
population, land area or natural resources) means that a local economy cannot exploit 
economies of scale and struggles to compete in a global economy where low cost produc-
tion or high volume consumption are valued and rewarded. Similarly, location is seen as 
a constraint where peripherality is experienced in terms of distance from markets. Here 
the costs of both exporting and importing threaten competitiveness of local economies, 
rendering them marginal. As we will see below, the interaction of these factors of scale 
and location are particularly felt in small island states in the Pacific Ocean.
One of the emerging themes of marginality studies is the relationship between margi-
nality and integration. Déry et al (2012:13) observe that ”some marginalisation processes 
have been triggered by the integration of the targeted population into larger systems, 
systems within which their decision power has diminished, thus augmenting their level of 
marginality.” They conclude: ”what is clear enough now is that, paradoxically, integration 
may signify marginalisation” (ibid). Such integration may particularly involve political 
integration, whereby the polities of marginal areas are absorbed by larger units; or eco-
nomic integration, especially where local economies become tied to the global economy. 
In analysing geographies of globalization, Murray and Overton (2014) have shown that 
there are simultaneous and contradictory process of homogenisation and differentiation as 
local economies are more closely integrated into global markets. With regard to margina-
lization, this would suggest that we might expect parallel processes of both diminution of 
local control and power (economic and political) and widening of opportunities to exploit 
new activities. Yet, with regard to the factors of scale and location mentioned above, it 
is probable that increased globalization heightens the disadvantages of small size and 
peripherality: small and remote economies cannot compete effectively in global markets 
and their political voice can go unheard.
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We also contend that one of the critical elements in understanding geographies of 
marginality is the way sovereignty is constructed and exercised. Sovereignty – the ability of 
communities and nations to exert effective control over their own welfare and development 
(Overton et al 2012) – often involves a complex and contested set of practices that balance 
national sovereignty and political independence with everyday practices and negotiations 
with other, often more powerful, states and global institutions. This is especially the case 
for small island states which face particular issues of marginality. Such issues, as noted 
in part above, include restricted environments, heightened natural hazards and risks from 
global environmental change, small populations and land areas, and isolation from global 
markets. Threats to their very survival and sites for human habitation are often accom-
panied – and preceded – by debates about their viability as independent states. Indeed, it 
could be suggested that small states may in practice ”sell” their sovereignty – or aspects 
of it – in order to secure greater benefits from large metropolitan powers.
In this paper we examine the South Pacific Island region and the island state of 
Niue in particular. We outline the dimensions of its marginality, pointing to its small size, 
relative isolation and restricted environment with limited natural resources. At the same 
time, we acknowledge how these characteristics might equally be seen as assets that can 
be used to construct a form of marginality that is, in fact, a basis for development and 
improved welfare. We then analyse how Niue’s political sovereignty has been carefully 
managed and asserted in ways that have allowed it both to secure greater integration with 
the outside world yet, simultaneously, retain a high degree of political self-determination. 
We conclude that this strategy of using complex and fluid approaches to sovereignty is 
a vital way for such marginal places to survive in an otherwise difficult and threatening 
wider economic, political and environmental world.
coNStructIoNS of MargINalIty IN tHe SoutH PacIfIc
The South Pacific Island region has often been portrayed as marginal and terms 
such as ”vulnerable”, ”isolated”, ”small” and ”fragmented” have frequently been used to 
describe the region and supposedly explain its relative lack of rapid economic growth and 
its continued dependence on external resources such as aid and remittances (see Hau’ofa 
1993, Overton 1993). These involve assumptions and constructions regarding the possible 
marginality of the region and we can hypothesise from these views that marginality is a 
characteristic of the small island states of the Pacific. We explore first what constitutes 
these constructions and how they depict the region.
dimensions of Possible Marginality
Firstly, the smallness of many Pacific Island states is readily apparent from Table 1. 
Of the region’s population of just under 10 million people, some two thirds (66 percent) 
live in one country, Papua New Guinea, and no other country has a population of over one 
million. Indeed, there are 10 countries (of the 21 states and territories listed in the region) 
that have fewer than 100,000 people. Furthermore, many countries have very small terre-
strial areas (see Figure One). Again Papua New Guinea is the exception with 83 percent 
of the region’s land area but most have less than 1000 square kilometres of land area. This 
1 Overton.indd   7 11.7.2014.   16:22:49
8
Hrvatski geografski glasnik 76/1 (2014.)
Tab. 1 South Pacific Island Territories – Basic Data
Tab. 1.  Južnopacifički otočni teritoriji – osnovni podaci





(Exclusive Economic Zone) 
(000s km2)
American Samoa 67,242 200 390
Cook Islands 11,142 237 1,830
Easter Island (Rapanui) 2,500 166  *
Federated States of Micronesia 106,836 701 2,978
Fiji 883,125 18,272 1,290
French Polynesia 294,935 3,521 5,030
Guam 183,286 541 218
Kiribati 100,743 811 3,550
Marshall Islands 67,182 181 2,131
Nauru 9,322 21 320
New Caledonia 256,275 19,103 1,740
Niue 1,311 259 390
Northern Mariana Islands 46,050 471 1,823
Palau 20,956 488 629
Papua New Guinea 6,187,591 462,243 3,120
Samoa 193,161 2,935 120
Solomon Islands 571,890 28,530 1,340
Tokelau 1,384 10 290
Tonga 105,916 747 700
Tuvalu 10,544 26 900
Vanuatu 224,564 12,190 680
Wallis & Futuna 15,398 255 300
South Pacific 9,361,353 551,913 30,569
* Not available - included in Chile
small size, in most cases, is accompanied by a subsequent lack of good soil and mineral 
resources (only the larger Melanesian states of PNG, Fiji, Vanuatu, New Caledonia and 
the Solomon Islands have substantial mineral resources and large tracts of fertile land). 
High population densities are often a result of diminutive land resources in the Pacific.
Small size is exacerbated by isolation. Although located in the middle of the econo-
mically vibrant Asia-Pacific region, the island states of the Pacific Ocean are found long 
distances from the main centres of economic activity in Asia and the Americas. Shipping 
lanes mostly by-pass the islands and, increasingly, air routes tend to over-fly them. The 
result of this isolation and small size is a double economic hit of very high transport costs 
and the inability to achieve economies of scale. Indeed, the past two decades of global 
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trade liberalisation have proved that hitherto successful export industries in the region, 
such as sugar production and garment manufacturing in Fiji, have struggled to survive 
(in the case of sugar) or largely disappeared (in the case of garments – [Storey 2004]) in 
an open global market.
The smallness theme, long of interest to scholars of the region (Selwyn, 1980; Shaw, 
1982; Ward, 1967; 1989), has been complemented in recent years by an environmental 
discourse that stresses environmental hazards and vulnerability. Tropical cyclones, tsu-
namis and periodic drought have always visited the region and its inhabitants, yet global 
concern for climate change and sea level rise have recently focused attention more on the 
low-lying states of the Pacific Ocean. There are fears that whole islands, even potentially 
whole countries in the Pacific, may disappear under a rising ocean. There are states with 
most if not all of their land area in the form of low-lying coral atolls (Tuvalu, Kiribati, 
Tokelau, the Marshall Islands as well as many islands in French Polynesia, the Cook 
Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia). Though the overwhelming majority of 
the region’s population lives on high islands, these too are susceptible to coastal erosion 
and inundation, matters that are linked to broader environmental hazards including sea 
level rise and climate change. Vulnerability, then, is a major theme in the way the region 
is portrayed, particularly by outside commentators and orthodox geographers (Britton, 
1980; Hamnett et al 1984; Ward 1993).
Taken together, the discourses of smallness, isolation and vulnerability have led to 
the suggestion that the very viability of some Pacific Island states may well be threatened 
(see Connell 2003, Barnett and Campbell 2010). If smallness and isolation fail to allow 
for the establishment of viable employment-generating activities, many inhabitants will 
seek to migrate in search of work, education and social opportunities. Indeed many states 
which have ready migration access to metropolitan countries (often present or past colo-
nial patrons) have experienced high rates of out-migration. We shall see this below in the 
case of Niue but it is also seen in the Cook Islands, Tokelau, Samoa, and the French and 
American territories of the Pacific. And if out-migration does not erode the viability of 
states, then, if the environmental vulnerability discourse is to be believed, many islands 
will become literally uninhabitable as a result of loss of land and, more crucially, loss of 
fresh water resources as sea level rise salinates fresh water lenses in atoll environments. 
With such apparent levels of vulnerability to both environmental and economic 
change, we can conclude from the above literature that the Pacific island region is expe-
riencing forms of marginality: marginality in terms of lack of resources and threats to 
its environments and marginality in terms of a lack of endogenous economic bases for 
growth and development.
Processes of Marginalization?
If these factors discussed in the preceding paragraphs are the dimensions of suggested 
marginality in the Pacific - smallness, isolation, environmental vulnerability and questi-
onable viability – then it is possible to identify the possible processes that are leading to 
such marginality. 
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We have noted how some countries whose citizens are able to migrate relatively easily 
have seen high rates of out-migration. This is particularly the case for outlying islands 
and regions where people have migrated not only overseas if they can but also to the main 
islands and towns. Thus we see not only absolute depopulation of certain islands but also 
of whole countries (such as Wallis and Futuna, Tokelau and Niue). Yet it would be wrong 
to portray migration and depopulation as a common process across the region, for where 
countries do not have a ready migration ”escape route”, many populations in the Pacific are 
growing rapidly, albeit in a highly concentrated urbanised form (for example the Solomon 
Islands and Vanuatu where urban growth rates are among the highest in the world). Thus 
the processes of emigration and population change are highly uneven across the region.
Similarly, we have seen how global environmental change is having an impact on 
the region and this process of marginalization, leading to heightened hazards and loss of 
resources, will only become more acute in the future. It seems to be an inexorable process 
of change. Even if sea level rise does not destroy the habitation sites of the majority of the 
region’s populations (absolute land loss after all will only affect a very small proportion 
of people), it is likely that increasing climatic variability and an associated warming of 
the oceans, with more frequent and acute storm and drought events forecast, will affect 
the living conditions of all, mostly for the worse.
A third key process of marginalization is global geopolitics. During the Cold War era, 
the region was able to benefit from superpower patronage (with high levels of aid, economic 
subsidies and protection, and, for some, ready migration outlets). This could be referred 
to as a geopolitical comparative advantage. However, the post-Cold War world, marked 
by trade liberalization and neoliberal economic policies, has dramatically reshaped the 
economies and societies of the region and will continue to do so. Trade protection (with 
guaranteed and subsidised access to metropolitan markets) has largely disappeared, local 
industries have often faltered and, perhaps paradoxically, Pacific economies have become 
more dependent on foreign aid and labour migration as – apart from those countries with 
large mineral, forestry or fisheries resources to exploit and export - they struggle to de-
velop viable independent export economies. Only tourism seems to offer a basis for local 
economic development in many islands.
It is on the very small and remote islands, on coral atolls in the periphery or isolated 
”rocks” (often barren raised coral formations) in the ocean, where marginality is most 
keenly felt. These are places such as Rapa Nui/Easter Island, Tokelau, Wallis and Futuna, 
Pitcairn, and the outlying islands in the Cook Islands, French Polynesia, Fiji, Tonga, the 
Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and PNG that seem to be facing particularly marginal futures, 
the result of both economic and environmental threats together with geopolitical and 
demographic consequences.
In summary, marginalization seems to be a reality for many parts of the Pacific Island 
region, though it is a reality that is felt highly unevenly. The larger states of Melanesia, with 
larger populations and good resource bases may be able to contemplate a future that can be 
built upon from local foundations and some sort of engagement with the global economy. 
Elsewhere, openings from tourism, remittances or (largely aid-funded) employment in 
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local bureaucracies seem to provide a form of durable livelihoods for many, especially 
those living in the main towns. 
Yet before we accept this somewhat pessimistic view of marginality in the Pacific 
Island region, we need to note that it has been rejected by some commentators, particularly 
from within the region. Most notably, the late Tongan scholar Epeli Hau’ofa was highly 
critical of portrayals of the region that stressed its smallness, vulnerability, dependence 
and isolation (and, by implication, its marginality). Instead he argued for an ”Oceanic” 
perspective; one which saw the Pacific not as a series of tiny specs in a vast and empty 
ocean but rather a large ocean of opportunity (Hau’ofa, 1993). There is a long history of 
very successful navigation, movement and exploitation across the ocean, not only to the 
islands themselves but also to what Pacific Islanders themselves might regard as their 
periphery – the Pacific Rim countries in Asia, Australasia and North America. It is from 
these relational views that we gain inspiration for our analysis of marginality in places such 
as Niue as we will discuss below. First, however, it is important to note the importance 
of sovereignty in shaping the ability of Pacific Island peoples to respond to marginality.
SovereIgNty aNd MargINalIty
Just as there is considerable diversity across the Pacific Island region in terms of 
environmental, demographic and economic conditions, so too are there many contrasts 
in the political status of states and territories. The states of the Pacific run the full gamut 
of political sovereignty from fully independent states (PNG, Fiji, Solomon Islands for 
example) through to fully incorporated territories (Rapa Nui/Easter Island) (Firth, 2006). 
In between lies a complex set of semi-dependent arrangements such as ”self-governing in 
free association” (for example Niue and the Cook Islands with New Zealand), and depen-
dent territories with degrees of internal self-government (such as American Samoa, French 
Polynesia, New Caledonia). What is critical here is the relationship between political sove-
reignty and welfare, which as we will see is not always neatly correlated in any direction. 
There are clearly costs and benefits of political independence. In many cases, Pacific 
Island peoples resisted colonial rule, such as in Samoa, and they strove to gain full political 
sovereignty. Such independence not only satisfied a quest for freedom from external control 
and the right of self-determination but it could also yield economic benefits. Regardless of 
the fact that states could have very small populations, independence brought a diplomatic 
status (a vote at the United Nations and a seat at negotiating tables) and this could be used 
to gain economic resources and political power beyond absolute size. During the Cold 
War era especially, independent countries could court rival superpowers and, in essence 
bargain one off against the other, attracting aid income. Such rivalry continues today with 
the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the People’s Republic of China seeking diplomatic 
recognition at the expense of the other. Japan has also sought support for its opposition to 
bans of commercial whaling and grounds for its high demand for fish and seems to have 
been able to secure some support from Pacific countries, often in return for aid. So we can 
readily hypothesise that sovereignty is for sale – countries can use their political status 
as a bargaining tool, trading diplomatic support or recognition for aid and other forms of 
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material support. Independence, in a sense, provides a significant asset than can be traded 
for financial and political return.
Selling sovereignty may also be played in more subtle forms, bringing other substan-
tial benefits and this involves an explicit closer relationship with a metropolitan patron, 
usually a former colonial power. In these cases, continuing forms of political incorporation 
with the metropole (a dependent territory, or self-governing in free association, or a rather 
more loose agreement setting out the elements of a close relationship) results in higher 
levels of aid (sometimes direct budget support and levels of welfare provision equivalent 
to the metropole), open access to migration and access to labour markets, and overall 
protection and security provision, even if the latter are rather fictional elements given the 
lack of any external security threats. Such agreements mean that dependence on a single 
patron is considerably heightened, and the possibility of trading off one dependence suitor 
against another is diminished, but the benefits may far outweigh these costs. As it is, some 
metropolitan powers, such as Australia (Dineen, 2004; Rosser, 2008), have adopted a more 
interventionist stance in the region in the past decade and have sought to reshape Pacific 
Island systems of governance through the Pacific Islands Forum and through aid regime 
changes, for example (Murray and Overton, 2011b). Dependence on key donors does create 
risks in the long term if these benefactors cease to provide aid. However, despite some 
significant cuts in the 1990s as a result of neoliberal-inspired policies, aid to the region 
(especially from the patron donors) has proved to be remarkably well maintained (see 
Figure Three below for Niue): arguably a much more long-term and sustainable revenue 
stream than, for example, export earnings. 
Bertram (2004) has analysed the relationship between political independence/de-
pendence and development in the Pacific and concluded that, indeed, those countries and 
territories with closer political ties and greater dependence on a patron do have higher 
incomes and better welfare provision. He also concluded that such an outcome is parti-
cularly the result of migration and remittances and integration of labour markets, not just 
that of explicit financial aid. Earlier Bertram and Watters (1985) propounded the MIRAB 
(Migration, Remittances, Aid and Bureaucracy) model for the Pacific as a way both of 
explaining why such dependent countries benefit more than their independent neighbours. 
They suggested that this might be a more viable (and durable) basis for well-being in small 
island states of the Pacific than problematic strategies to promote export-led economic 
growth. 
Thus we suggest that sovereignty is an important asset that can be used in complex 
ways to help combat marginality in parts of the Pacific. ”Selling sovereignty” may be one 
means to achieve this: trading diplomatic support of degrees of political integration for 
explicit return in the form of material aid and political support. In other ways, though, the 
process is much more complex and subtle and involves intricate negotiations that vary from 
place to place. Metropolitan powers, whilst keen to maintain historical ties and political 
influence and perhaps also help assuage some colonial guilt, are at the same time sensitive to 
accusations of overt influence and forms of neo-colonial rule. Thus, Pacific states can adopt 
a careful strategy of both seeking closer relationships yet asserting their independence and 
resisting interference. American Samoa is an interesting example of how this process can 
work. It is an unincorporated territory of USA. People born in the territory are classified 
1 Overton.indd   13 11.7.2014.   16:22:50
14
Hrvatski geografski glasnik 76/1 (2014.)
as US ”nationals” but not ”citizens” but they have full and unrestricted rights of entry to 
USA. They elect their own legislature, and executive power is held by a locally elected 
Governor, though the President of the USA remains Head of State. Although residents do 
not pay US federal taxes, a considerable share of public expenditure on education, infra-
structure, and all the apparatus of government is heavily supported by the USA through 
the Office of Insular Affairs, in the US Department of the Interior. In effect, American 
Samoa governs itself fully but the American taxpayer foots the bill, while access to work 
in the USA provides considerable opportunities for employment and remittances home. 
Returning to the marginalisation hypothesis, we argue that what is important is not so 
much the physical characteristics (smallness, remoteness, environmental fragility, climate 
change etc), nor the economic and social processes (such as out-migration) that define 
marginality but rather the way power is unevenly exercised, through aid regimes and 
political-economic relationships, that is critical. Power is held and exercised in different 
ways and to different degrees by both donors and Pacific Island states. The interplay of 
both determines the degree to which Pacific states can become integrated or not into the 
global economy and thereby to improve or limit the welfare of their citizens. We see Pacific 
Island states as being active agents, not passive recipients, in this geo-political realm where 
discourses of marginality can be constructed and negotiated in order to secure resources 
and benefits. The following case study provides some insight into the complexity of these 
power relationships. 
NIue: a caSe Study
Niue is a Pacific island country that comprises a single island – a raised coral island 
of 259 square kilometres and a population of around 1300 people (Figure Two). It has 
labelled itself ”The Rock of Polynesia” – a reference to its singular geology. It is easy 
to construct a case for its marginality. Being made of raised coral, its soil resources are 
generally poor, there are no mineral resources of note and its forest resource (despite some 
logging in the past) is not economically viable for exploitation (Terry and Murray, 2004). 
Similarly, although the country commands a substantial maritime economic zone, it has 
not been successful in establishing an export fishery industry. There have been attempts 
to promote agricultural production as a basis for development whether for export (copra, 
vanilla, passionfruit and, recently, noni juice) or import substitution (dairying) but these 
have failed to become established and agriculture on the island remains largely for hou-
sehold subsistence production. Its rocky coastline with raised coral cliffs presents several 
disadvantages in the form of a lack of a good deep-water port or attractive sandy beaches 
for tourists, though it may prove an advantage as some limited protection against rising 
sea levels. Niue is isolated. Its nearest neighbour is Tonga, over 400 kilometres to the 
west but both its shipping and air links are with New Zealand, with a weekly flight and a 
monthly shipping service to Auckland. Transport costs are very high, though most ships 
returning from Niue do so with spare capacity in their holds as imports far exceed exports 
both in terms of value and volume. Finally, it is subject to potentially devastating natural 
hazards as was illustrated by the impacts of Cyclone Heta in 2004, which destroyed critical 
infrastructure such as the hospital and main hotel, wiped-out a significant proportion of 
export agriculture and led to heightened de-population. 
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Clearly it can be argued that Niue is characterised by marginality in terms of its envi-
ronment, its resources, its economy and its remote location. It has not been uncommon to 
see articles in the media questioning its very existence. Following Cyclone Heta in 2004, 
the New Zealand Herald newspaper published an article entitled ”Viable future for Niue 
looks bleak” and there was wide discussion about how Niue might survive as an indepen-
dent state (Pacific Disaster Center 2004).
constructing marginality as an asset
Despite this picture of vulnerability and fragility and the generally negative conno-
tations that flow from this, we argue that marginality can equally be constructed in a po-
sitive sense. Niueans have been successful in using the resources they have, including the 
island’s very condition of marginality, to leverage considerable benefits for themselves.
Given the problems encountered with attempts to establish export production in 
agriculture or fisheries (Murray, 2002), tourism appears to be Niue’s only realistic option 
Fig. 2 Niue
Sl. 2.  Otok Niue
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in terms of an endogenous basis for economic growth and development. Although it lacks 
beaches, it does offer tourists whale-watching, fishing, cycling and visits to coral caves 
as attractions. Furthermore, the fact that it is not a conventional tropical Pacific Island 
destination may be appealing for tourists seeking peace and quiet and a different Pacific 
tourism experience. The marketing of Niue as a tourism destination makes much of its 
marginality: supposed negative attributes (isolation, smallness, rugged environment) are 
turned into attributes (Connell 2008b). Even the low frequency of airline connections 
(one flight a week to and from Auckland) helps construct a particular tourism experience, 
with tourists staying for a minimum of a week and conforming to an informal schedule of 
activities over the seven days (for example particular restaurants are known to have their 
own special nights and associated events during the week). Although heavily subsidised by 
New Zealand aid (see below), the tourism industry in Niue seems to be establishing itself 
successfully and it is attracting increasing numbers (the 6000 visitors in 2011 represented 
a marked increase from the 3500 four years earlier). Its marginality has become perhaps 
its greatest selling point.
Foreign aid is a critical element of Niue’s economy and it helps maintain a public 
sector that is the island’s largest employer by far: the Niuean government accounted 
for 56 percent of paid employment on the island as recorded in the 2006 census (Niue 
2008:xii). Because local sources of government revenue are minimal, aid has to provide 
for the costs of basic public services. These services include a hospital, schools (inclu-
ding a high school), transport infrastructure, electricity generation and distribution, law 
and order and other basic services. However, as well as providing most of the resources 
needed to maintain services on the island, aid revenue has also been used increasingly 
to promote economic development in ways that would be impossible otherwise. The air 
service from Auckland (run by Air New Zealand, substantially owned by the New Zealand 
government) was subsidised for a time by the New Zealand aid budget, though it now 
appears to be viable and without need of continuing subsidy. Shipping services are also 
subsidised. And in perhaps the most striking example of aid support, New Zealand aid 
was used to purchase the Matavai Resort (the only tourism resort on the island – other 
ventures being smaller largely household run accommodations) and pay for significant 
renovations and enlargement. Under this aid arrangement, the resort will pass from New 
Zealand government ownership back to a largely Niuean-owned company. What is notable 
here is that New Zealand aid funding was used to purchase and develop a tourist facility 
and then gift it to local hands: it is strategy that runs entirely counter to the New Zealand 
government’s own neoliberal principles and its current programme at home to divest itself 
of state-owned assets. 
Overall, aid revenues to Niue have increased steadily in the past decade (Fig. 3). Aid 
has also come in other forms and from other sources. Concern for climate change and 
sea level rise has led many aid donors to increase aid funding for environmental projects 
across the Pacific region. Although, as we have seen, Niue is not at any immediate risk 
from rising sea levels, the overall image of Pacific Island vulnerability to climate change 
has helped direct some such resources to Niue. Its environmental concerns may be more 
to do with water supplies or waste disposal issues, such as how to manage old asbestos 
building material or old motor vehicles, but aid donors seem to have their own agendas. 
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Although New Zealand dominates aid provision (with around $US14 million in 2008), 
there are signs that other donors are interested in supporting Niue. Australia and Japan 
supply funds (around $US 2 million in 2008), but China is yet to have a presence, as it 
has in many other countries of the Pacific (Ratuva, 2011).
The reason aid inflows have been so high and increasing is largely because of the 
sovereignty status of Niue. Niue became a British Protectorate in 1900 but soon passed to 
New Zealand who annexed the territory and, for some time, administered it as part of the 
Cook Islands. Its colonial history was marked by episodes of incompetence and relative 
neglect (Scott 1993) but when independence was granted in 1974, Niueans chose in a 
referendum to be self-governing in association with New Zealand (rather than either full 
independence or continuation as a New Zealand territory). Under this arrangement, New 
Zealand took responsibility for functions such as defence and external relations and agreed 
to offer continuing assistance but Niue had its own legislature and constitution. Association 
with New Zealand gave Niueans the full rights of New Zealand citizens, free to enter the 
country at will. Many did and today over 90 percent of people claiming Niuean ancestry live 
in New Zealand, with a significant proportion living also in Australia, rather than in Niue.
This special sovereignty arrangement is a critical element in its strategy for dealing 
with its own marginality. Aid and remittances (and now tourism) help maintain livelihoods 
on the island – enjoying relatively high material standards of living compared to most other 
Pacific Island countries - whilst those who feel they want to, can fly to New Zealand and 
seek employment, higher education or be reunited with kin there (Connell 2008a). It may 
have resulted in depopulation (see below) but is beyond doubt that Niueans have been 
successful in using this sovereignty status to construct a more durable and varied set of 
livelihood options for themselves. Indeed, when we examine the sovereignty alternatives 
for Niue, we can appreciate how marginality has been dealt with effectively. If Niue had 
Fig. 3  Official Development Assistance to Niue 1975-2009 ($US in constant 2009 prices)
Sl. 3.  Službena razvojna pomoć za otok Niue od 1975. do 2009. (usklađeno s cijenama iz 2009.)
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voted for full independence in 1974, it is likely that it would have struggled to survive in 
the same way as a viable political entity: it might have been able to benefit from playing 
superpower politics in the 1980s (though it would have not had the diplomatic resources 
to engage in this well) but its aid income would have been much less and more variable. 
If it had voted to remain a New Zealand territory (in effect opting for integration with 
New Zealand), it is likely that it would have gained much as the New Zealand government 
would have had to provide a level of services equivalent to those ”at home”. Yet it could 
be argued that this is probably happening already and that services provided are at least 
equivalent, if not better, than for an equivalent sized community in New Zealand (which 
would not expect its own hospital or high school). Providing such services at even a mini-
mal level in a small and remote community such as Niue means that a whole hospital, for 
example, has to be built, as the service cannot be subdivided or provided from afar). And 
as part of New Zealand, it could not expect the government to buy and develop its local 
tourist resort. As a patron donor, New Zealand has found itself committed to providing a 
high level of service provision, which is difficult to reduce without attracting criticism of 
neglect of its responsibilities to a dependent territory. A final option for Niue (though not 
one they were able to choose in 1974) would have been to be incorporated into another 
territory such as the Cook Islands. This would have perhaps been the worst option of all. 
For although it might have benefited in a similar way from the ”free association” model 
with high aid levels and free movement as New Zealand citizens, Niue’s very identity 
would have been submerged and it would have become just another outlying island with 
limited ability to control its own destiny, even higher rates of depopulation, a much smaller 
public service and local employment, and no effective sovereignty that it could trade on.
It can be argued that Niue’s very marginality is another reason for the high levels of 
aid support it receives. Its small population size means that it cannot maintain a viable 
bureaucratic apparatus and public services without external support, its isolation and 
economic size means that effective links to the outside world cannot be developed and 
maintained without subsidy, and its rugged environment and the environmental hazards it 
faces cannot be endured and mitigated without some forms of outside assistance. Perhaps 
also, its smallness and potential political fragility mean that it needs close ties to a benign 
benefactor to stop it falling into the hands of terrorists, money launderers, criminal gangs 
or undesirable foreign suitors – as some metropolitan powers might fear for several Pacific 
Island states (Fry 1997, Ward 1989). Once again marginality has been reconstructed from 
a set of negative attributes and constraints to become a means of attracting considerable 
material support from outside.
”demarginalization” or development at the margins
Having seen how marginality has been actively constructed as an asset for Niue, 
rather than as something to blame for its ills, we now turn to examine how the processes 
of marginalization, which we noted above for the Pacific (depopulation, environmental 
change and geopolitics), are to a large extent being balanced by counter processes – what 
might be termed the processes of ”demarginalization” or at least processes of development 
that can occur within the context of development at the margins.
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In analysing these processes we return to the MIRAB model of Bertram and Watters 
(1984). It is clear that since this model was first suggested over 25 years ago, much has 
changed in terms of global environments, economies and politics, yet the basic findings 
of the model remain valid. Furthermore, it is clear that the well-being of Niueans can be 
favourably compared to other Pacific Island states. Educational enrolment rates are very 
high, over half the population claim to have had secondary education and a third have tertiary 
education. The labour force participation rate is very high at 78 percent, life expectancy at 
birth is 67 years for males and 76 for females, and infant mortality is rare (only one case 
was recorded between 2001 and 2006) (Niue 2008: xii). In 2007 Niue was able to report 
that it had either achieved all the Millennium Development Goals (including the key goals 
regarding poverty, education, health and gender equality) or was on track to achieve them 
(environmental sustainability) (Niue 2007:53; also Naidu, 2009).
Migration and remittances are perhaps the most critical element of the model and 
are the most important processes of development for Niue. Figure Four tracks population 
change in Niue. Here we see steady depopulation since the 1970s. Population decline is 
continuing but the possibility of Niue becoming totally depopulated is unlikely as both 
the local government and aid donors appear committed to maintain the community. What 
migration has done is provide a safety valve for the island’s population. Instead of being 
stuck ”on the rock”, people can find employment, education and widened lifestyle options 
in New Zealand in particular. If this substantial movement of people off the island spelled 
an end to their contact with the island and those who remain, it might be considered a 
problem. However, this is far from the case. Although many Niueans have permanently 
settled overseas, most retain some contact with the islands. Money is remitted back to 
Fig. 4  Niue population 1900-2011
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relatives on the island, and people travel frequently to the island to enjoy family reunions 
or merely have a holiday with their relatives. Others engage in a form of circular migra-
tion. Some grow up in Niue, go offshore for higher education or employment, and then 
return later in life to retire or find more relaxing forms of work and living. Yet others may 
engage in shorter spells of work offshore, returning with their savings to lead an island life 
for a while. The migration connection also works because expatriate Niueans retain their 
connections whilst overseas, offering accommodation and support for those who move, 
and maintaining Niuean societies and culture in communities in Auckland, Wellington, 
Sydney and elsewhere. So it can be argued that remittances and migration have proved 
to be a durable and beneficial form of activity, in effect a form of development that is 
sustainable at least in the medium term (Connell 2008a).
The aid and bureaucracy elements of the MIRAB model have proved to be similarly 
long lasting, though they are more reliant on the whims of foreign politics than they are on 
the decisions and actions of Niueans themselves. Figure Three showed that aid revenues have 
grown in real terms over the past decade in particular. This has allowed for the maintenance 
of public services and a reasonable body of employment on the island. Yet the aid stream 
has not been consistent, either in volume or in character. Following independence in 1974, 
New Zealand maintained a degree of budget support, directly supporting public services. 
However, in the 1990s, changes in New Zealand’s aid policies, following a neoliberal 
turn, both diminished the volume of aid noticeably and shifted it away from supporting 
government services and towards discrete development projects (Scheyvens and Overton 
1995). This badly affected both the provision of public services and, more crucially, the 
level of public sector employment. This neoliberal phase seems to have given way to a new 
regime in the past decade, what elsewhere we have termed a ”neostructural” aid regime 
(Murray and Overton, 2011a). This has reinstated substantial aid to the public sector to 
provide services and resulted in much higher volumes of aid. Moreover, even though the 
New Zealand aid programme has shifted again since 2008 towards a more market-led 
approach to economic development (Banks et al 2012), it has also been accompanied by 
a renewed interest in New Zealand’s ”realm” (its former territories, including Niue) and 
the volumes of aid have continued to grow. Thus, despite some variability in aid volumes 
and policies, foreign financial support for the public sector in Niue, and the consequent 
support for significant public sector employment, aid and bureaucracy have also proved 
to be reasonably strong and durable bases for relative prosperity in the face of marginality.
A final aspect of ”development at the margins” not explicit within the MIRAB model 
is tourist development. As we have seen, this has required particular support in Niue and, 
despite some promising signs, it has not yet become firmly established as a viable basis 
for economic development on the island. But given the rise in tourist arrivals and the 
commitment of both the Niue government and aid partners to develop the sector, it seems 
that this is helping counteract (and indeed leverage off) Niue’s marginality.
coNcluSIoNS
This paper has addressed the issue of marginality in the Pacific Island region and paid 
particular attention to the country of Niue. This state of approximately 1300 people has 
1 Overton.indd   20 11.7.2014.   16:22:50
21
Sovereignty for Sale? Coping with Marginality in the South Pacific – the Example of Niue
survived and, arguably, prospered despite some strong markers of marginality: its small-
ness, isolation, lack of natural resources, environmental threats and declining population.
What can be seen in Niue is an interesting interplay of simultaneous processes of 
marginalization and development. At the same time as some factors of marginality are be-
coming more acute in the region (global environmental change, more neoliberal world trade 
and an end to protectionism and subsidy, and increasing population mobility and possible 
depopulation), we see that counter processes are both intensifying and even turning these 
apparently negative changes to the advantage of Niue. Thus migration may be emptying 
some of the villages of Niue but it is also widening the development options for Niueans 
and providing an income stream for the island from remittances. Similarly, whilst global 
politics may have led to the faltering of hitherto subsidised industries, continuing concern 
for geopolitical security and poverty alleviation have helped maintain and increase aid 
budgets so that services and employment continue to provide livelihoods and welfare for 
Niuean residents. Even climate change may have been partly balanced by the new inflow 
of resources from Western donors, guilty perhaps that their contribution to global warming 
is leading to serious consequences for Pacific Island states.
In these parallel processes of marginalization and development we have discerned 
an interesting strategy being adopted by various individuals and agencies in Niue and the 
wider region. This involves constructing marginality as an asset rather than as a constra-
int on development. Thus, isolation, remoteness and a lack of development can become 
selling points for the Niuean tourism industry; vulnerability to climate change may be 
used as a way of attracting aid funding; and the smallness and fragility of a microstate’s 
public sector is used as a way of again attracting aid support to maintain services and 
employment. Marginality does not spell the demise of countries such as Niue; rather it 
provides a potential means for its survival if it is constructed appropriately and negotiated 
carefully. Furthermore, marginality is not absolute, nor is physically determined. Rather, 
marginality is malleable: it is constructed, traded, negotiated and restructured, often with 
the active involvement and direction of those whom others might term as ”marginal”, 
namely local polities and communities. 
In these processes of change and negotiation, it is interesting that both the periphery 
(Niue) and the metropole (in this case New Zealand) are complicit in the active construction 
of the marginality narrative, for both gain in some way. For Niue, marginality is a way of 
attracting attention and support (though hopefully not excessive interference); for New 
Zealand, the portrayal of Niue as a marginal country helps it justify its aid programme 
in the region (which it does often for wider geopolitical reasons) and it gains kudos from 
other aid donors as a result (perhaps absolving it of responsibility for acting elsewhere in 
more difficult aid environments). In a parallel way, the construction of tourism images of 
Niue suits both the local businesses wishing to attract tourists and those tourists who seek 
a different, more ”marginal” tourism experience away from the mainstream of Pacific 
tourism. With such complicity in the portrayal off Niue, gains may be made but it does 
obscure a more nuanced and critical understanding of what the real parameters of Niue’s 
marginality are.
Finally in this case study, we have seen the importance of sovereignty. The ability of 
this putatively small and marginal island state to survive and prosper is, we argue, largely 
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due to its ability to maintain its separate identity and political self-determination. This 
sovereignty is in practice flexible, malleable and negotiated, so that elements of Niue’s 
independence are traded for material gain (whether through aid or migration opportuni-
ties). Yet, in the end, absolute sovereignty is not for sale. By making some concessions 
to its independence yet strongly holding on to Niuean identity and its right to govern 
itself and determine its own development, Niue has been able to gain much more than it 
ever would have by either becoming fully independent or becoming fully integrated into 
the New Zealand (or any other) state. A sense of sovereignty and the recognition of that 
sovereignty by others, is perhaps the greatest asset small island states such as Niue have 
in dealing with their marginal place in the global economy. 
NoteS
1  The phenomenon of ”constructing” places and their ”consumption” in the tourism industry has been analysed 
at length by Urry (1995).
2  The MIRAB model has been revisited by other commentators and, although some other elements, such as 
tourism, have been suggested as important, the basic tenets of the model are still largely accepted (Bertram 
2006).
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SAŽETAK
Suverenitet na prodaju? Hvatanje u koštac s 
marginalnošću u Južnom Pacifiku –  
primjer otoka Niuea
John Overton, Warwick E. Murray
Južnopacifički otoci izuzetno su marginalizirani prema globalnim standardima. Fizička uda-
ljenost od globalnih tržišta pogoršana je malenom površinom i ograničenim resursima otoka, koji 
su po postanku uglavnom koraljni atoli ili izdignuti grebeni. Globalizacija često pojačava učinke 
marginalizacije ukidajući zaštićeni pristup tržištima te neoliberalnim restrukturiranjem javnog sek-
tora, što kao posljedicu ima smanjenje zaposlenosti na domaćem tržištu rada. Nadalje, klimatske 
promjene i podizanje razine mora prijete gubitkom ili degradacijom naseljivog tla, kojeg je već 
sada malo. Unatoč svemu tome pacifički narodi i njihove vlade pokazali su otpornost u suočavanju 
s problemima marginalizacije. Jedan od odgovora na prikazane probleme bila je migracija, no to je 
uključivalo kompleksan proces cirkulacije i održavanja veza s otocima. To je ovisilo i o pronalaženju 
”domaćina” za migrante. Razvojna pomoć također je bila jedan od čimbenika koji su omogućili 
preživljavanje otočnim narodima, što je uključivalo suptilnu strategiju traženja pogodnih donatora 
i ispunjavanje njihovih zahtjeva uz čuvanje određene razine suvereniteta. U oba ta procesa pitanje 
suvereniteta bilo je najvažnije. Korist se dobivala prepuštanjem dijela efektivnog suvereniteta 
drugoj državi (najčešće bivšemu kolonijalnom upravitelju), a takvo pokroviteljstvo obilježeno je 
izdašnom razvojnom pomoći i izuzetno povoljnom zakonskom regulacijom migracije. I u takvim 
asimetričnim geopolitičkim odnosima otočne države na marginama uspjele su održati suverenitet. 
Rad se bavi primjerom otoka Niuea, s manje od 1500 stanovnika, koji ima status samouprave u 
slobodnom savezu s Novim Zelandom. 
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